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INTRODUCTION
"[T]he right to free speech is not absolute."' With these words,
the California Supreme Court held that an injunction posing a "con-
tent-neutral restriction upon expression"' found to violate Califor-
nia's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA)3 does not violate the
First Amendment. 4 The California Supreme Court's four-to-three de-
cision marks the first time that a reviewing court has found that an
injunction against racial epithets in the workplace does not constitute
a prior restraint.5 The Aguilar decision also stretches the boundaries
of a debate about free speech and workplace rights that has been
building since the 1980s. Many scholars have discussed the First
Amendment implications of imposing civil liability for speech that
B.A., Colorado College, 1997; J.D. Candidate, 2001, University of Pennsylvania Law
School. I am grateful to my parents, Mary Kay and David Randall of Fort Collins, Colorado, for
their continuing encouragement and support. Thanks to Professor Alan Lerner for his
thoughtful reading and critique of this Comment. Special thanks to my Grandma and Grandpa
Randall, who gave me a room to write in while I was visiting in December 1999 and July 2000.Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 21 Cal. 4th 121, 134 (Cal. 1999) (citing Near v. Min-
nesota, 283 U.S. 697, 708 (1931) (noting that "[Il]iberty of speech, and of the press, is also not
an absolute right, and the State may punish its abuse")).
2 Aguilar, 21 Cal. 4th at 145.
3 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940 (1999).
4 Aguilar, 21 Cal. 4th at 147 ("Because [the defendant's] past use of such epithets in the
workplace had been judicially determined to violate the FEHA, prohibiting him from continu-
ing this discriminatory activity does not constitute an invalid prior restraint of speech."); see also
U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech.. ").
Prior cases dealing with injunctions against continuing speech or conduct in Title VII
cases either found the injunctions were a prior restraint, or did not address the issue of prior
restraint. See McLaughlin v. New York, 784 F. Supp. 961, 978 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) (refusing to en-
join the continuing blacklisting of the plaintiff on the grounds that the proposed injunction
would constitute an unlawful prior restraint); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F.
Supp. 1486, 1534-35 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (issuing an injunction against a continuing course of
conduct found to constitute sexual harassment on the grounds that "[t]he pictures and verbal
harassment are not protected speech because they act as discriminatory conduct in the form of
a hostile work environment") (citation omitted).
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violates employment discrimination statutes.' The Aguilar decision
takes the debate one step further by assuming that the First Amend-
ment permits the imposition of civil liability for speech found to vio-
late anti-discrimination statutes like the FEHA, and then finding that
the First Amendment also permits a court to issue an injunction
against the continuation of that specific speech pattern.'
This Comment analyzes the Aguilar decision, applies it to Title VII
employment discrimination cases, and argues that an injunction
against speech found to violate Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act is
not a prior restraint. Part One reviews the doctrine of prior re-
straints. Part Two analyzes the Aguilar decision. Part Three discusses
the elements of a "hostile work environment" under Title VII, and
analyzes the constitutionality of anti-discrimination statutes that en-
compass speech. Finally, Part Four argues that an injunction against
speech found to violate Tide VII is not a prior restraint if the injunc-
tion meets the three-factor test articulated by the Aguilar court.
I. THE DOCTRINE OF PRIOR RESTRAINTS
The doctrine of prior restraint developed as a limitation of form,
not of substance, permitting subsequent punishment for certain
forms of expression while prohibiting the prior restraint of the same
expression. Thomas Emerson has identified the following policy
6 See generally Larry Alexander, Banning Hate Sperh and the Stidra and Stones Dfey, 13
CONST. COMErNT. 71, 100 (1996) ("'The First Amendment is in the Constitution to check what
is quite natural, particularly the urge to punish those with whom you disagree because you hate
or fear those whose thoughts you find hateful or dangerous."); Kingsley . Browne, Title VII as
Censorship: HostileEnvironment Harassment and the lirst Amendmrnt, 52 01110 ST. L.J. 481. 531
(1991) ("[Ihe current interpretation of Title VII cannot withstand scrutiny under current
[F]irst [A] mendment doctrine."); Charles . Calleros, 7ile II and Free Spyrdi: The Fist Arr-end.
ment is Naot Hostile to a Content-Neutral Hostile Environment 7Tho1r, 19961 UT.H L REV. 227. 259
(1996) ("[A] content-neutral hostile-environment theory can constitutionalh" impose liability
for a broader range of [discriminatory workplace] expression than threats and fighting
words."); Richard H. Fallon,Jr., Sexual Haraswent, Content Neutrality, and the First Amewndment Dzg
that Didn't Bark, 1994 Sup. Gr. RE%,. 1, 51 ("The hostile-work-environment cause of action ... fits
more comfortably into the tapestry of existing First Amendment doctrine than its critics have
imagined."); Ellen R. Pierce, Reondling Sexual Harassmnt Sandioas and Free Speeh Rights in the
Workplace, 4 VA.J. SOC. POL'Y & L 127, 219 (1996) (arguing that harassing speech may be re-
stricted in the workplace without offending First Amendment principles if several substantive
criteria are met);James H. Fowles III, Note, Hostile Environmerts and the Tra Anredr.ent: Ithat
Now After Harris and St. Paul?, 46 S.C. L RE%'. 471, 503-504 (1995) (suggesting that employer
and employee defendants might be able to raise a First Amendment defense in Title VI! Cases
involving workplace speech); Amy Horton, Comment. Of Sutpeision, Cntiefo!ds, and Cnsorship:
Sexual Harassment, the First Amendment, and the Contours of Title 1II, 46 U. MIAMI L REV. 403. 452
(1991) (arguing that allowing Title VII defendants to use the First Amendment as a defense
would "unnecessarily upset the balance of rights and obligations between employers and em-
plo)ees established by Title VII").
See Aguilar, 21 Cal. 4th at 136 (noting that the United State Supreme Court's decision in
R.A.V. v. SL Pau, 505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992), leaves "little room for doubt" that tie First
Amendment permits the imposition of cvil liability for pure speech that violates die FEI-Al.
8 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 708-11 (1931) (noting that the Supreme Court iews
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reasons for the general presumption against prior restraints: prior
restraints allow greater governmental scrutiny and approval of ex-
pression than subsequent punishment; prior restraints suppress
communication because it occurs before the speech; they increase
the likelihood of an adverse decision because the burden is on the
defendant, not the plaintiff; they lack the procedural protections of a
jury trial; they allow less opportunity for public appraisal, leading to a
greater possibility of abuse of political power; and they give the de-
fendant greater warning, but at the cost of free expression.
For the purposes of this analysis, prior restraints may be divided
into two broad categories. The first encompasses licensing systems in
which a particular form or method of expression is permitted only af-
ter certain procedures are followed. ° Licensing cases involve "permit
or license requirements designed to determine the alleged obscenity
of books, plays or films, or to regulate access to public forums."" The
second broad category, which will be the focus of this paper, encom-
passes judicial injunctions against "specific aspects of a particular
kind of communication," or injunctions preventing "all communica-
tion entirely."02 Aguilar and other cases involving injunctions issued
against speech found to violate anti-discrimination statutes like the
FEHA and Title VII fall into this category.
prior restraint cases with "regard to substance, and not to mere matters of form" and "distin-
guishing between prior suppression and subsequent punishment"); Thomas I. Emerson, The
Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAWV & CONTEMP. PROBS. 648, 648 (1955) (noting that "the issue is
not whether the government may impose a particular restriction of substance in an area of pub-
lic expression ... but whether it may do so by a particular method .... In other words, restric-
tions which could be validly imposed when enforced by subsequent punishment are, neverthe-
less, forbidden if attempted by prior restraint"); see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
"151-52:
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but this consists
in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for
criminal matter when published. Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sen-
timent he pleases before the public; to forbid this is to destroy the freedom of the press,
but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous or illegal, he must take the conse-
quences of his temerity.
But see Paul A. Freund, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 4 VAND. L. REv. 533, 544 (1951) (ar-
guing that there is an "artificiality of an absolute distinction between prior restraint and subse-
quent punishment"); John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE LJ. 409, 419
(1983) ("The doctrine [of prior restraint] is fundamentally unintelligible. It purports to assess
the constitutionality of government action by distinguishing prior restraint from subsequent
punishment, but provides no coherent basis for making that categorization.").
q Emerson, supra note 8, at 656-658.
1o See id. at 655-56 (describing statutory prior restraints that "where the government limita-
tion .. undertakes to prevent future publication or other communication without advance ap-
proval of an executive official" and "legislative restraints which make unlawful publication or
other communication unless there has been previous compliance with specific conditions im-
posed by legislative act").II
Stephen R. Barnett, The Puzzle of Prior Restrain4 29 STAN. L. REv. 539, 544 (1977).Emerson, supra note 8, at 656.
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The general presumption against prior restraints was established
in Near v. Minnesota's In Near, after a newspaper printed allegations
that law enforcement officials were not doing theirjobs, a state court
issued a permanent injunction against the future publication of the
paper.14 The court issued the injunction under a Minnesota law pro-
viding that any person who published or circulated "malicious, scan-
dalous and defamatory" newspapers or periodicals was guilt) of a nui-
sance, and that "all persons guilty of such nuisance may be
enjoined....",1 5 The Near court found that the statute constituted an
invalid prior restraint because its purpose and effect w%-as to permit
authorities to enjoin the publication of allegations of "official derelic-
tion" 6 without requiring the officials to prove the "falsity of the
charges," 7 "suppress[ing] the offending newspaper"" and "put[ting]
the publisher under an effective censorship."" As Near involved is-
sues of media censorship, the decision emphasized the importance of
preserving the "liberty of the press," noting that "the constitutional
guaranty of the liberty of the press gives [the press] immunity from
previous restraints." 2 Writing for the majority, ChiefJustice Hughes
noted that the prohibition against prior restraints applies in all but
"exceptional cases," like the obstruction of military recruiting or pub-
lication of "the sailing dates of transports or the number and location
of troops."
21
Near marked the first time the Supreme Court "employed the doc-
trine [of prior restraint] to strike down a legislative act," and "the first
time [the Supreme Court] vigorously and effectively enunciated the
doctrine of prior restraint. - In the seventy years since the decision,
Near has become associated with a "sort of syllogism" about injunc-
tions and prior restraints:
Prior restraint of speech is presumptively unconstitutional, even where
the speech in question is not otherwise protected.
An injunction is a prior restraint.
Therefore, an injunction against speech is presumptively unconstitu-
tional, even where the speech enjoined is not otherwise protected. -
is 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
14 Id. at 704 ("There is no question but that the articles made serious accusauons against the
public officials named and others in connection with the prealence of crimes and the failure to
expose and punish them.").
5 Id. at 702 (quoting MINI STAT. §§ 10123-1- 10123-3 (1927)).
16 Id. at 713.
17 Id. at 709.
is I. at 711.
19 Id. at 712.
- Id. at 719.
21 Id. at 716.
Emerson, supra note 8, at 654.2
3Jeffiies,Jr., supra note 8, at 417.
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In recent years, the Near syllogism has been criticized by scholars
arguing that "a rule of special hostility to administrative preclearance
[or licensing] is fully justified, but a rule of special hostility to injunc-
tive relief is not."4 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions support
these arguments, suggesting that the Near injunction was unconstitu-
tional because it was overly broad,25 and not because injunctions
themselves are per se unlawful prior restraints.
While Near established a general presumption against prior re-
straints, the Supreme Court has "never held that all injunctions are
impermissible." 6 In fact, the Court has indicated that injunctions will
be upheld if (1) the order is "based on a continuing course of repeti-
tive conduct," (2) the order "is clear and sweeps no more broadly
than necessary," and (3) the order does not go into effect before the
conduct in question has been found to be illegal. Thus, an injunc-
tion is not a prior restraint if the order is comprehensive and concise,
and if the order is based on a recurring pattern of behavior that a fact
finder has determined to be illegal.
As applied in Pittsburgh Press, these factors minimize the harms
that the doctrine of prior restraint was developed to address. In Pitts-
burgh Press, the Supreme Court held that an injunction against gen-
der classification in classified ads, issued after the ads were found to
violate the city's human relations ordinance, was not an unlawful
prior restraint.28  Unlike the injunction in Near, which was issued
"upon the mere proof of publication, " ' the injunction in Pittsburgh
Press was issued only after the Pittsburgh Commission on Human Re-
lations received evidence, heard arguments from the parties, and
found that Pittsburgh Press violated a local ordinance." Because the
order was issued after the Commission found that Pittsburgh Press'
conduct was illegal, the injunction acted more as a subsequent pun-
ishment than as a prior restraint."' The requirement that the injunc-
24 Id. at 433; see also Barnett, supra note 11, at 543 (arguing that, in the absence of the collat-
eral bar rule, the presumption that an injunction is an invalid prior restraint is "correspond-
ingly undermined").
Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 445 (1957) (distinguishing Near on the
grounds that "Minnesota empowered its courts to enjoin the dissemination of future issues of a
publication because its past issues had been found offensive," manifesting "'the essence of cen-
sorship'" (citing Near, 283 U.S. at 713)).
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 390 (1973)
(citing Lorainjournal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 156 (1951) (holding that "[i]njunctive
relief under § 4 of the Sherman Act is as appropriate a means of enforcing the Act against
newspapers as it is others")).
Pittsburgh Press Co., 413 U.S. at 390 (citing New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.
713, 733 (White, J., concurring) (1971) (noting that the injunction in question was overly
broad)).
2, Pittsburgh Press Co., 413 U.S. at 390.
29 Near, 283 U.S. at 709 (1931).
30 Pittsburgh Press Co., 413 U.S. at 379-80.
31 But cf Near, 283 U.S. at 709 (noting that, "there was no allegation that the matter pub-
lished was not true," and that "judgement... proceeded upon the mere proof of publication").
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tion must be based on a "continuing course of repetitive conduct"
distinguishes the injunction in Pittsburgh Press from the statute in
Near, which asked the court to "speculate as to the effect of publica-
tion."32 This "continuing course" requirement also limits government
scrutiny and approval of expression to "particular cases which are the
subject of complaint," instead of requiring "universal inspection" of
any expression that falls under the statute. Under the requirement
that an injunction sweep no more broadly than necessary, the Pitts-
burgh Press order enjoins the publication of sex-designated employ-
ment advertisements while permitting future publication of ads "with
no reference to sex,"' punishing the violations of the Human Rela-




California's Fair Housing and Employment Act (FEHA) states that
it is unlawful
[f]or an employer.., or any other person, because of race ... [or) na-
tional origin.., to harass an employee... [or] an applicant ....
Harassment of an employee... [or] an applicant... by an employee
other than an agent or supervisor shall be unlmaful if the entity, or its
agents or supervisors, knows or should have known of this conduct and
fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action.'
FEHA's definition of "harassment" includes "[v]erbal harassment,
e.g., epithets, derogatory comments or slurs on a basis enumerated in
the Act."3'
Aguilarinvolved a complaint under the FEHA by seventeen Latino
employees of Avis Rent A Car. ' The employees alleged that John
Lawrence, a station manager at Avis, "verbally harassed" the plaintiffs,
and that another Avis employee conducted a discriminatory investiga-
tion of a missing calculator that was later found, questioning only La-
tino employees and threatening to call the Immigration and Natu-
ralization Services if the employees did not cooperate." At trial, the
jury found that Lawrence "harassed or discriminated against" several
of the defendants, and the judge found "a substantial likelihood" that
Lawrence would continue to make harassing and discriminatory
s2 Pittsburgh Press Co., 413 U.S. at 390.
Emerson, supra note 8, at 656.
Pittsburgh Press Ca, 413 U.S. at 380.
Compare Near, 283 U.S. at 710-711 (noting that the Near statute ,as not 'directed ... sim-
ply at the circulation of scandalous and defamatory statements mith regard to pvatc citizens"
but at the suppression of newspapers and periodicals that print allegations of official corrup-
tion).
CAL GOV'T CODE § 12940 (a),(j).
37 2 CAL CODE REGS. § 7287.6(b) (1) (A).
SS Aguilarv. Avis Rent a Car Sys., Inc.. 21 Cal. 4th 121,126 (Cal. 1999).
" Id at 126-27.
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comments "unless restrained."40  Because of this, the court issued an
injunction ordering Lawrence to "cease and desist from using any de-
rogatory racial or ethnic epithets directed at, or descriptive of," La-
tino employees of Avis for "as long as he is employed by Avis."" The
order also stated that "[d] efendant Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. shall
cease and desist from allowing defendant John Lawrence to commit
any of the acts described [the above quoted paragraph]."" The Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals held "that to the extent the injunction pro-
hibits Lawrence from continuing to use racist epithets in the work-
place it is constitutionally sound, but to the extent it reaches beyond
the workplace," the injunction exceeded the scope of the FEHA."'
The Court of Appeals ordered the trial court to "redraft the injunc-
tion in a manner that.., limits its scope to the workplace," and to in-
clude "an exemplary list of prohibited derogatory racial or ethnic epi-
thets, specifying epithets such as those actually used in the workplace
by Lawrence."4  Defendants appealed, arguing "that the injunction,
even as limited by the Court of Appeal, constitutes an improper prior
restraint of freedom of expression."45
The California Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeal's de-
cision, holding that "an injunctive order prohibiting the repetition,
perpetuation, or continuation" of speech found to violate the FEIA
does not constitute a prior restraint. 6 In doing so, the Aguilar Court
noted three factors that must be present to prevent an injunction
from serving as an unlawful prior restraint: (1) the order may be is-
sued only after a jury finds that the defendants engaged in unlawful
employment discrimination;47 (2) the order must be based on a "con-
tinuing course of repetitive conduct;48 and (3) the order must be
"clear and sweep[ ] no more broadly than necessary."" These re-
40 Id. at 127.




45 Id. at 129.
46 Id. at 140.
47 Id. at 138-40 (citing Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 437 (1957) (upholding
an injunction against further "sale and distribution of written and printed matter found after
due trial to be obscene"); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Human Relations Comm'n, 413
U.S. 376, 389 (noting that there is no First Amendment interest in protecting an activity when
the "activity itself is illegal and the restriction.., is incidental" to a valid government interest);
Kramer v. Thompson, 947 F.2d 666, 675 (3d Cir. 1991) (noting that the "Supreme Court has
held repeatedly that an injunction against speech generally will not be considered an unconsti-
tutional prior restraint if it is issued after ajury has determined that the speech is not constitu-
tionally protected")).
48 Aguilar, 21 Cal. 4th at 140 (citing Pittsburgh Press Co., 412 U.S. at 390 (noting that an in-
junctive order based on "a continuing course of repetitive conduct" presents less danger that
communication will be suppressed before a court can determine that the communication is not
protected by the First Amendment because the Court will already be familiar with the publica-
tion's effect)).
49 Aguilar, 21 Cal. 4th at 140 (citing Pittsburgh Press Co., 413 U.S. at 390).
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quirements were satisfied in Aguilar because the injunction wv-as issued
after ajury found that the defendant's comments constituted unlaw-
ful employment discrimination, and because the trial judge deter-
mined that there was a "substantial likelihood" that the defendant's
"continual and severe" comments would continue unless enjoined."
The Aguilar factors are based on the ones enunciated by the Su-
preme Court in Pittsburgh Press, and they serve a similar function by
minimizing the harms the doctrine of prior restraints wvas developed
to address. Again, the requirement that the order must be based on
a "continuing course of repetitive conduct" limits the court's scrutiny
to the particular instances of speech that are the basis of the lawsuit,
instead of permitting government scrutiny of all workplace speech, or
all future speech by the defendant." Similarly, the requirement that
the order is clear and sweeps no more broadly than necessary permits
the court to enjoin and punish the defendant's violation of FEHA
without censoring the defendant's future speech. Unlike the pub-
lisher in Near,52 Lawrence will have a clear notice of the language he
must avoid, and the circumstances under which he must avoid it.'
Aguilar's requirement that the defendant's conduct may only be en-
joined after ajury finds that the conduct constitutes employment dis-
crimination provides an additional check against government efforts
to limit freedom of expression, because it guarantees the defendant a
jury trial.54
M Aguilar, 21 Cal. 4th at 127.
51 See infra note 53.
52 See Near, 283 U.S. 697, 710 (1931) (noting that te Minnesota statute -gives no definition
[of the type of publication to avoid] except that covered by the words 'scandalous and defuna-
toryc).
Some have argued that, while a system of prior restraint "affords individual citizens
greater certainty in the law" because "an individual can find out what is permitted and wdhat is
forbidden without incurring the danger of criminal sanctions." prior restraints limit free ex-
pression and limit the exchange of free ideas. Emerson. supra note 8. at 659. Injunctions like
the one in Aguilar do not limit free expression, however, they simply enjoin continuing viola-
tions of the FEHA. As several commentators have noted. workplace speech is already subject to
a number of restrictions, by private employers under the emplo)ment-atmill doctrine. by dte
NLRB, and by the government in public sector employment. See Pierce. supra note 6. at 419.25
(noting that "speech rights in the workplace-whether those of the employee or the em-
ployer-have traditionally played second fiddle to other policy and statutory considerations");
David C. Yamada, Voices From the Cubicle: Protecting and Encouraging Priate Evip!tree Spech n the
Post-Industrial Workplacte 19 BERELEYJ. E.MP. AND LkB. L 1, 4 (1998) (noting that the decline of
unionization, the threat of lay-offs, employer surveillance of e-mail and phone conversations,
and "[rlising corporate political and social partisanship" limit private sector employees' self-
expression at work). But see Browne supra note 6, at 516 (arguing that "the termn 'workplace' is
not a talisman that extinguishes first amendment protections"); Mark N. Maillery & Robert
Rachal, Report on the Growing Tension Batuwe First Amendmnat and Harassirn-et law, 12 LB. LW.
475, 482 (1997) (concluding that "[t]he workplace is not a 'First Amendment free' zone').
Emerson, supra note 8, at 657 (noting that in die absence of a jty tral, "the procedural
protections built around the criminal prosecution.., are not present').
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III. HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The trial court's ability to impose civil liability for speech that vio-
lates the FEHA was not at issue in Aguilar.5 The defendants only
challenged the trial court's injunction, and not the underlying deci-
sion. 6 In addition, the defendants failed to provide the court with a
record of the specific comments found to violate FEHA." Neverthe-
less, the California Supreme Court concluded that the imposition of
civil liability for "pure speech that creates a racially hostile or abusive
environment" under the FEHA does not violate the First Amend-
ment. 8 In doing so, the court relied on United States Supreme Court
decisions suggesting that "speech of this nature" is not constitution-
ally protected. 9 While these cases involve speech that is sexually, not
racially, charged, the United States Supreme Court frequently uses
the same analyses in both Title VII race and sex discrimination cases,
"citing precedent from the two contexts interchangeably."'
See Aguilar v. Avis Rent-a-Car System, Inc., 21 Cal. 4th 121, 135 (Cal. 1999) (noting that
"[t]he sole issue in the present case is whether the First Amendment also permits the issuance
of an injunction to prohibit the continuation of such discriminatory actions").
% Id. at 131.
57 Id. at 132 (rejecting defendants' claim that the enjoined comments consist of protected
speech because the defendants "failed to provide this court with a record adequate to evaluate
this contention").
5 Id. at 134.
"9 Id. at 134-35 (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (holding that a
company president's repeated comments to an employee were sufficiently "severe and pervasive
enough to create an objectively [and subjectively] hostile or abusive work environment" under
Tide VII); Meritor Savings Bank, FSB, v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (holding that an em-
ployee's allegations, including allegations her employer made inappropriate suggestive re-
marks, "are plainly sufficient to support a claim for 'hostile work environment' sexual harass-
ment"); R.AV. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992) (noting that "sexually derogatory 'fighting
words,' among other words, may produce a violation of Title VII's general prohibition against
sexual discrimination in employment practices")).
60 Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Wo*: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation
in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 MARV. L. REV. 1750,
1759 n.32 (1990) (citingJohnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 631 (1987) (citing a
race-based affirmative action case to uphold a sex-based affirmative action plan under Title
VII)); Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66-67 (citing Title VII decisions recognizing race-based harassment to
support recognition of a cause of action for hostile work environment sexual harassment); Do-
thard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977) (noting that prior cases 'with similar allegations
that facially neutral employment standards disproportionately excluded Negroes from employ-
ment ... guide our approach" in an analysis of facially neutral standards alleged to dispropor-
tionately impact women)); see also Mark Seidenfeld, Some Jurisprudential Perspectives on Employment
Sex Discrimination Law and Comparable Worth, 21 RUTGERs L.J. 269, 299 (1990) (noting that, in
many cases, "the courts have treated sex and race as equally invidious classifications and applied
the same doctrinal analysis to discrimination based on either classification"); Howard Eglit, The
Age Discrimination in Employment Act's Forgotten Affirmative Defense: The Reasonable Factors Other
Than Age Exception, 66 B.U. L. REV. 155, 211 n.257 (1986) (noting that, while the Supreme
Court distinguishes between race and sex "in terms of invidiousness for purposes of constitu-
tional analysis... the two are equated" for the purpose of Title VII discriminatory impact anal)-
sis).
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Because Aguilar arose under a state statute, the First Amendment
implications of Title VII liability for workplace speech were not at is-
sue. This section discusses the factors involved in the creation of a
hostile work environment under Title VII, and then discusses the
constitutionality of the imposition of civil liability for speech that vio-
lates Title VII.
A. Hostile Work Environment
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act makes it "an unlawful em-
ployment practice for an employer.., to discriminate against any in-
dividual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin."6' Cases of sexual harassment and
racial harassment, like Aguilar, are often pursued under the theory of
hostile work environment discrimination.
The Supreme Court first recognized hostile work environment
discrimination in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, when it held that
"[t]he language of Title VII is not limited to 'economic' or 'tangible'
discrimination."12 Although Meritor dealt with sexual harassment, the
Court based its decision on lower court cases recognizing racial har-
assment as a violation of Title VII., While hostile environment dis-
crimination under Title VII is most often associated ith sexual har-
assment, the concept applies to both race and sex discrimination."
"[N]ot all workplace conduct that may be described as 'harass-
ment'" entails a hostile work environment.' Speech may contribute
to a hostile work environment, but a "mere offensive utterance" alone
does not create a hostile work environment.' Wfhile discriminatory
conduct must be "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the condi-
tions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working en-
vironment, ' "67 it need "not seriously affect employees' psychological
61 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a).
477 U.S. 57,64 (1986).
See Pierce, supra note 6, at 148-49 (noting that the Court drew 'upon the body of develop-
ing case law on racial or ethnic hostile enironmental harassment... [when stating] that *a re-
quirement that a man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of
being allowed to work and make a living can be as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest
of racial epithets'") (citing Merilor, 477 U.S. at 67)).
See MICHAELJ. ZBIMER ET AL, CASES & MATERLILS ON E !PLortE.MT DtLsmuttiNL1iON. 638-
639 (4th ed. 1997) (discussing hostile work environment claims in the context of race. sex, na-
tional origin, and age discrimination).
MetAr, 477 U.S. at 67.
Harris v. Forklift S)stems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993): sm also M etor. 477 U.S. at 67 (cit-
ing Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that -mere utterance of an et h-
nic or racial epithet" would not create a hostile work environment)); International Brother-
hood of Teamsters v. U.S., 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977) (noting that to make out a claim of
discrimination under Title VII, the plaintiff "had to prove more than the mere occurrence of
isolated or 'accidental' or sporadic discriminatory acts").
a Metor, 477 U.S. at 67.
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well-being."' Instead, the test is whether, given "all the circum-
stances," speech creates an environment that "would reasonably be
perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive.""0 Factors to con-
sider include the frequency and severity of the conduct, whether the
conduct interferes with the employees' performance, and "whether
[the conduct] is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere of-
fensive utterance."70 Thus, while a "mere offensive utterance" alone
does not constitute a hostile work environment, repeated use of racial
epithets, or sexually derogatory language, in a manner that is fre-
quent, humiliating, and interferes with the employee's performance,
may create a hostile work environment.'
B. Civil Liability for Speech that Creates a
Hostile Work Environment, and the First Amendment
A recent line of Supreme Court cases permitting incidental gov-
ernment regulation of speech where the applicable statutes only ex-
plicitly limit non-speech elements suggests that anti-discrimination
statutes like Title VII do not violate a defendant's First Amendment
rights. In United States v. O'Brien, the Supreme Court held that "when'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course
of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulat-
ing the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First
Amendment freedoms."72 Under the O'Brien test, government regula-
tion is "sufficiently justified" where: (1) "it is within the constitutional
power of the Government;" (2) "it furthers an important or substan-
tial government interest;" (3) "the government interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression; and (4) "the incidental restric-
tion on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than essen-
tial to the furtherance" of the government interest.73
The imposition of civil liability for speech that violates Title VII is
constitutional under the O'Brien test. First, as the Supreme Court has
held, the government has a legitimate interest in preventing dis-.• ° 74
crimination. Second, the government's interest in ending employ-
Is Harris, 510 U.S. at 22.
69 Id. at 22-23.
70 Id. at 23.
71 See, e.g., Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1456 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that a
series of offensive utterances, "if sufficiently severe and pervasive, could give rise to an objec-
tively hostile work environment"); Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 110-111 (2d Cir.
1997) ("[W]hether racial slurs constitute a hostile work environment typically depends 'upon
the quantity, frequency, and severity' of those slurs, considered 'cumulatively in order to obtain
a realistic view of the work environment ... '" (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 23)).
7 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
73 Id. at 377.
74 See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 626 (1984) (holding that ",ussuring
women equal access to such goods, privileges and advantages [as "business contracts and em-
ployment promotions"] clearly furthers compelling state interests"); Alexander v. Gardner-
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ment discrimination is independent of an), interest in the suppression
of free expression.' Finally, any incidental restriction on the defen-
dant's alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than neces-
sary because liability is only imposed after ajury finds the defendant's
speech constitutes hostile work environment discrimination under
Tide VII.
76
Professor Richard Fallon has argued that Title VII may not pass
the third requirement of the O'Brien test because "the First Amend-
ment has to limit the legislature's power to enact 'general' statutes
that aim at prohibitable conduct but sweep in speech that the legisla-
ture adjudges harmful only because of its content."" To illustrate his
argument, Fallon imagines a city ordinance that generally prohibits
race- and sex-based discrimination in housing, public accommoda-
tions, education, and private club membership, forbidding "all public
or private acts and utterances tending to create a racially or sexually
hostile environment." Fallon argues that this ordinance "would
surely offend the First Amendment" and suggests that Title VII would
have similar problems, noting that "Title VII's prohibition against
speech that creates a hostile work environment must be distin-
guished... on some ground other than the 'generality' of the stat-
utes' prohibitions or the 'incidental' character of their restrictions on
speech."'9
Tide VII does not have the same generality problems as Fallon's
imagined ordinance. Tide VII's purpose is to "eliminate... dis-
crimination in employment, "s" including discrimination "against any
individual with respect to his... terms (and] conditions... of em-
ployment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.""' Rather than prohibiting "all public or private acts
and utterances tending to create a racially or sexually hostile envi-
ronment,"n hostile environment employment discrimination only en-
compasses conduct or speech that is "sufficiently severe or pervasive
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974) (noting in its discussion of Title VII that i[iln the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, [citation omitted] Congress indicated that it considered te policv against
discrimination to be of the 'highest priority'" (citing Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., Inc.. 39U
U.S. 400, 402 (1968)).
See H.R. REP. No. 88-914 (1963), reprintd in 1964 U.S.C.C..N. 2391, 2401 Isautng that
the purpose of Tite VII is "to eliminate, through the utilization of formial and infonnal remc-
dialprocedures, discrimination in employment").
See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487 (1993) (citing Title \Il as ant exmnple of a
permissible content-neutral regulation of conduct" that did not infringe on cinploer's First
Amendment rights); RA.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992) (notig that "sexually
derogatory 'fighting words,' among other words, may produce a violation of Title vIl's general
prohibition against sexual discrimination in employment practices").
Fallon, supra note 6, at 15.
Id. at 16.
19 MId.
so H.R REP. No. 88-914 (1963), rqprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391.
81 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
Fallon, supra note 6, at 16.
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'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment. . ."" Title
VII is not a general prohibition against racially- or sexually-charged
offensive utterances, but a specific prohibition against discrimination
in employment conditions, including discrimination that occurs
when speech creates or contributes to a hostile work environment.
Title VII liability might also be imposed under R.A. V. v. St. Paul"
In R.A. V, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, enunciated the sec-
ondary effects test, stating that "words can in some circumstances vio-
late laws directed not against speech but against conduct" where the
speech is "swept up incidentally within the reach of a statute directed
at content rather than speech."85 Thus, speech that contributes to a
hostile work environment may be "swept" within the scope of Tide
VII, which is aimed at racially or sexually discriminatory conduct in
the workplace. 6 In addition, Scalia specifically noted that "sexually
derogatory 'fighting words,' among other words, may produce a viola-
tion of Title VII's general prohibition against sexual discrimination in
employment practices.",7 Although dicta, Scalia's specific recognition
that "sexually derogatory 'fighting words"' may violate Title VII pro-
vides further evidence that the imposition of civil liability for speech
that is found to violate Title VII does not violate the First Amend-
ment.ss
Five years earlier, in Boos v. Barry, the Court held that "[t]he emo-
tive impact of speech on its audience is not a 'secondary effect."' 8
While several commentators have argued that under Boos, the "crea-
tion of a hostile [work] environment is [not] a prohibitable secon-
dary effect,"9° Boos can be distinguished from a hostile work environ-
ment employment discrimination case. Boos dealt with a Washington,
83 Meritor, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
84 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
65 Id. at 389.
86 Some critics have suggested hostile work environment cases based exclusively on speech
or expression can not satisfy the secondary effects test because, in these cases, "speech [is] not
incidentally suppressed, it [is] the only thing suppressed." See Fowles, supra note 6, at 496 (cit-
ing Stair v. Lehigh Valley Carpenters and Joiners Local Union No. 600, 62 Empl. Prac. Dec.
(CCH) P 42, 602 (E.D. Pa. 1993), aff'd 43 F.3d 1463 (3d Cir. 1994) (issuing an injunction
against the creation of a calendar containing photos of nude women after finding that the cal-
endar created a hostile work environment)). This argument ignores the fact that, while speech
may be the only evidence of a hostile work environment in some cases, the purpose of Title VII
is not to regulate speech, but to regulate workplace conduct that is racially or sexually discrimi-
natory. Thus, speech is "swept up incidentally" within the reach of a statute that is otherwise
aimed at regulating discriminatory conduct, and the secondary effects test is satisfied.
87 505 U.S. at 389.
88 See Cecilee Price-Huish, Comment, "Because the Constitution Requires It and Because Justice
Demands It". Specific Speech Injunctive Relieffor Title VII Hostile Work Environment Claims, 7 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 193, 211 (1998) (noting that RA.V. suggests that "[o]nce they classify it as
conduct, courts may enjoin speech as constituting illegal conduct").
89 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988).
90 Fallon, supra note 6, at 17. See alsoAguilar v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 21 Cal. 4th 121,
135, n. 4 (Cal. 1999) (finding that "the effects of Lawrence's use of racial epithets on plaintiffs is
not a 'secondary effect'").
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D.C. ordinance prohibiting the display of any sign ithin 500 feet of a
foreign embassy if the sign would bring the embassy's government
into "public odium" or "public disrepute."" On its face, the purpose
of the Boos statute was to regulate speech based on the speech's emo-
tional impact Title VII's purpose is not to regulate speech based on
the speech's emotional impact. While hostile work environment dis-
crimination involves conduct that may be "humiliating," and that in-
terferes with another employee's performance,-' the purpose of Title
VII is not to regulate the content of speech but "to eliminate,
through the utilization of formal and informal remedial procedures,
discrimination in employment....""' Comments that constitute a
hostile work environment are not illegal because they hurt the plain-
tiff's feelings,"3 but because they are part of a pattern of discrimina-
tory treatment that alters the plaintiff's "terms and conditions of em-
ployment"7 solely because of the plaintiffs race or sex.
Even if Title VII did not fall within the secondary effects test, the
Supreme Court's decisions in Harris, B.A.V and Mitchell make it "vir-
tually inconceivable that the Supreme Court might hold that the First
Amendment forbids the imposition of Title VII liability for a broad
category of sexually harassing [or racially discriminatory] speech."
'
The United States Supreme Court's recognition that words may vio-
late Title VII clearly demonstrates that "spoken words are not consti-
tutionally protected.""
91 485 U.S. at 316.
9" Id. at 319 (noting that, "[h]ere the government has determined that an entire category of
speech-signs or displays critical of foreign governments--is not to be permitted').
93 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993). Se also Friedrich Kubler. Hawr, Much
Freedom For Racist Speech?, 27 HoFsTRA L. REV. 335, 366 (1998) (noting that 'racist speech advo-
cates discrimination, and it denies the right to equal protection and treatment").
9 SeeH.R. REP. NO. 88-914 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391.
See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinison, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (noting that 'not all
workplace conduct that may be described as 'harassment" entails a hostile work enironment;
Harris, 510 U.S. at 23 (noting that "a mere offensive utterance" does not violate Title VI1).
96 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a).
97 See Price-Huish, supra note 88, at 214 (observing that '[d]iscriminatory conduct ... affects
more than the listener's ego or feelings. Ultimately, the results of continuously abusive, harm-
ful speech will be demonstrated by decreased job performance, inability to advance, employ-
ment stagnation, and attrition of minority race and gender status emploees'). BuL see Fowles.
supra note 6, at 493-94 (arguing that "the hostile [work] environment standard inherently fo-
cuses on the emotive impact of speech" because Title XI is violated not when a sexist or racist
remark is made, but only when that remark harms the listener).
so Fallon, supra note 6, at 9. See also Price-Huish, supra note 88, at 211 (noting that. "ilt
seems that, in R.A.V, the Court gave the green light to the idea that racist or sexist speech.
which is severe and pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment. is tantamount to
'discriminatory conduct' as proscribed by the employment discrimination provisions in Title
VIr).
99 Aguilar, 21 Cal. 4th 121, 135 (Cal. 1999).
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IV. TITLE VII INJUNCTIONS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Tide VII provides for injunctive relief "[i]f the court finds that the
respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging
in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint."'
While some district courts have discussed the use of injunctions
against speech found to violate Title VII,"°" a federal court has y'et to
find that these injunctions do not constitute a prior restraint. 02 In
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.,0 3 the trial court generally found
that an injunction against conduct found to constitute sexual harass-
ment did not violate the defendant's First Amendment rights, noting
that "the pictures and verbal harassment are not protected speech
because they act as discriminatory conduct in the form of a hostile
work environment."'04 The Robinson court did not specifically address
the question of prior restraint.
In McLaughlin v. New York Governor's Office of Employee Relations,' '
the trial court refused to enjoin the defendants from continuing to
blacklist the plaintiff, stating that it "could not possibly design an or-
der that would be concise enough to avoid chilling defendants' pro-
tected speech.' 0 6 The McLaughlin court also noted that "[t]he Su-
preme Court has consistently directed that prior restraints are wholly
impermissible when a sufficient after-the-fact remedy exists," finding
that the plaintiff could bring a defamation suit if the blacklisting con-
tinued.'
While the McLaughlin court did not believe it could design an or-
der "concise enough to avoid chilling defendants' protected
speech,"'08 the three factors adopted by the Aguilar court and the cur-
rent precautions used by federal courts issuing Title VII injunctions
would allow federal courts to issue permanent injunctions for speech
that creates a hostile work environment without creating an unlawful
prior restraint.
100 42 U.S.C. § 2 0 00e-5(g).
101 See, e.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991);
McLaughlin v. New York Governor's Office of Employee Relations, 784 F. Supp. 961 (N.D.N.Y.
1992).
102 In Snell v. Suffolk County, a district court found that the First Amendment did not bar the
court from granting an injunction ordering the employer to announce and enforce at) anti-
discrimination policy forbidding the use of racial epithets,jokes and the posting or distribution
of derogatory material in the workplace. 611 F. Supp. 521, 531 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). While the in-
junction ordered the employer to monitor its employees' speech, it did not directly enjoin indi-
vidual employee defendants' speech. The Snell court did not address the issue of prior restraint
or discuss the reasoning behind its decision, noting that none of the parties "raised the issue
and it would be inappropriate for the court to address it on its own motion." Id.
103 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
104 Id. at 1535.
105 784 F. Supp. 961 (N.D.N.Y. 1992).
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Injunctions are appropriate where a monetary award alone is un-
satisfactory, "either because, as in the case of menual suffering, valua-
ion is impossible, or because accurate measurement of the harm is
difficult."' Courts already issue permanent injunctions "to remedy a
broad range of Title VII violations," including: ordering employers
to discontinue employment tests that adversely impact minorities; re-
quiring employers to cease and desist discriminatory practices against
women; and "requiring an employer with a history of management
acquiescence in sexually harassing conditions" to announce a man-
agement policy against harassment, and to adopt and require "educa-
tion, training, and development of effective complaint procedures."'"
In addition, courts already employ a number of strategies to monitor
the use of Title VII injunctions, including invalidating injunctions
that are overly broad.' or too general, 2 and requiring plaintiffs who
request an injunction to meet a heightened standard of proof."'
The three-factor test developed in Aguilar further limits the dan-
ger that an injunction might serve as a prior restraint on the defen-
dant's speech.11 4 The requirements that the injunction is based on a
continuing course of repetitive conduct and sweeps no more broadly
than necessary limit the danger of "universal"" ' government inspec-
tion, because the injunction only covers speech by the defendant in
the workplace that has specifically been found to violate Title VII.
There is little danger that the injunction will suppress communica-
tion before it occurs, because the injunction will only be issued after
the plaintiff establishes the defendant's pattern of speech and ajury
finds the speech violates Title VII." 6 Under Title VII, the plaintiff
109 Development in the Law-Injunctions, The Changing Limits of njundtnt Rief. 78 HXRV. L REV.
994, 1002 (1965) [hereinafter Development in the Law-njundions].
110 45C AM.JuR. 2DJob Discrimination § 2905 (1993).
I See, e-g., Davis v. Richmond, 803 F.2d 1322, 1328 (4th Cir. 1986) t(inlidating an tnjunc-
tion that forbid the defendant to commit "further violations of Title VII" on the grounds that
the injunction was overly broad") (citing NLRB v. Express Publ. Co., 312 U.S. 426. 436 (1941J
(holding that an injunction prohibiting an employer from committing ffirther violations of the
NLRA impermissibly subjected the employer to contempt proceedings for conduct 'unlike and
unrelated to... [the violation] with which... [it] uas originally charged")).
112 See, eg., Payne v. Travenol Labs., Inc., 565 F.2d 895, 895-96 (5th Cir. 19781 (holding that
the portion of an injunction prohibiting defendants fron "[d]iscriminating on tile basis of
color, race, or sex in employment practices or conditions" was too general. and failed to de-
scribe in reasonable detail the acts or act the injunction ,as intended to restrainls.
11See, eg., Wagner v. Taylor, 836 F.2d 566, 576 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that a plaintiff
must establish "irreparable injury" or "imminence of further retaliation" to get an injunction
under Title VII).
114 See genera/y! supra note 9 and accompanying text (Emerson's list of polic, reasons behind
the general presumption against prior restraints).
Emerson, supra note 8, at 665.
116 See Devdopment in the La-Injundions, supra note 109. at 1009. noting that tile danger that
an injunction will deter future communication:
is absent when the injunction is phrased to prevent repetition of a specific defamatory
statement already published, rather than to prevent all possible defamation in the fu-
ture .... If courts confine themselves to narrow injunctions against specific co,nmmuica-
tions instead of broad decrees, judicial supervision need be no more continuous than in
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must prove not only that the defendant made the statements, but that
the statements constituted hostile work environment discrimina-
tion.' 7 Therefore, the burden of initial action is on the plaintiff, not
the defendant, and there is less propensity for an adverse decision.
The jury verdict requirement also guarantees that the defendant will
receive the procedural protections of a jury trial and provides an op-
portunity for public appraisal, reducing the danger of abuse of gov-
ernment power.
The effect of the Aguilar three-factor test may best be demon-
strated through the creation of a model injunction. Cecilee Price-
Huish has suggested that the following model injunction would offer
"appropriate, meaningful, and contextual relief to the victims" ' in
the Robinson.. case:
Jacksonville Shipyards is ordered immediately to cease any policy, activity,
or omission that allows, perpetuates, or condones sexual harassment.
Furthermore, Jacksonville Shipyards, and all employees thereof, are or-
dered immediately to refrain from using any abusive, hostile, or harmful
speech that is directed toward female employees or is spoken in the pres-
ence of female employees that implicates considerations of sex or gender
in the workplace. Any workplace use of, or references to, the following
words.., will be considered violative of this order: cunt, whore, bitch,
dick. This list is a non-exclusive list that is meant to provide guidance
and context in determining whether other words are violative of this or-
der. This injunction also prohibits the workplace use of any other words,
through speech or any other form of verbal or non-verbal communica-
tion, that a reasonable person could reasonably understand to invoke or
incite similar meaning, communicative import or emotive impact as the
explicitly prohibited words.12
0
Huish's model injunction is overly broad, and would probably be
struck down under Aguilar and Pittsburgh Press. First, under Aguilar,
the injunction should be limited to "a specific pattern of speech" that
has been found to violate Title VII.'12  While Huish provides a list of
words that will violate the order, she further enjoins the defendants
from using any communication "that a reasonable person could rea-
sonably understand to invoke or incite similar meaning... as the ex-
plicitly prohibited words. " '2 This model injunction is not limited to
conduct by the defendant which has been found to violate Title VII,'1
3
damage actions.
''7 But cf. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 709 (1931) (noting that the Nearstatute required
the plaintiffs to prove publication, but not "to prove the falsity of the charges that have been
made" against the defendant, or even to allege that the articles were "not true" or "malicious").
18 Price-Huish, supra note 88, at 215.
19 Robinson v.Jacsonville Shipyard, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
12 Price-Huish, supra note 88, at 215.
1 Aguilar v. Avis Rent a Car, 21 Cal. 4th 121, 140 (Cal. 1999).
122 Price-Huish, supra note 88, at 215.
123 See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 390
(1973) (holding that an injunction against speech will be upheld if the order does not go into
effect before the conduct in question has been found to be illegal); Aguilar, 21 Cal. 4th at 138
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but implicates any speech about "sex or gender in the workplace" by
any of the defendant's employees. Pittsburgh Press and Aguilar both
require the injunction to be based on "a continuing course of repeti-
tive conduct,"12 4 yet Huish's injunction encompasses behavior that
may not have been part of the pattern of conduct presented at trial.
Robinson is a challenging case because it involved several different
types of sexual harassment from a number of employee-defendants.
Male employees posted pornographic photos in the workplace, re-
peatedly requested sexual favors from the plaintiff, painted sexually
explicit phrases in the plaintiffs work area, and continually com-
plained about having women in the workplace.' ' A list of words
alone cannot adequately describe all the conduct to be enjoined,
both because of the varying types of harassment and because the
plaintiffs could not remember every single epithet used against
them.
126
Because of its complexity, however, Robinson is a good example of
how the three-factor test developed in Pittsburgh Press and Aguilar can
effectively address speech that creates a hostile work environment
without creating a prior restraint on the defendant's expression. I
propose the following injunction, under the requirements of Pitts-
burgh Press and Aguilar
Jacksonville Shipyards is ordered immediately to cease any policy. activity,
or omission that allows, perpetuates, or condones sexual harassment.
Jacksonville Shipyards, and Defendant Employees, are ordered immedi-
ately to refrain from the workplace use of, or reference to, the following
words, through speech or any other form of verbal or non-verbal com-
munication: cunt, whore, dick, and bitch. In addition, the Defendant
Employees are ordered to cease any derogatory sexual or gender-related
comments directed at female employees ofJacksonville Ship)ards, and to
refrain from any uninvited touching of female employees, while in the
Jacksonville Shipyards workplace.
This model injunction meets all of the requirements set out by Agui-
lar and Pittsburgh PressY"2 The injunction is "clear and sweeps no
more broadly than necessary,"ms because it only enjoins the defen-
dant employees' behavior, in their capacities as employees of Jack-
sonville Shipyards, while they are at the workplace. The requirement
that the order may only be issued after a jury has found that the de-
fendants engaged in employment discrimination is met because the
order enjoins only behavior byJacksonville Shipyards and the defen-
(holding that the order may be issued only after ajury find the defendants engaged in unlawful
employment discrimination).
I- Pittsburgh Press Co., 413 U.S. at 390; Aguilar, 21 Cal. 4th at 140.
12 Robinson v.Jacson-ille Shipyard, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 149I-1501 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
126 See id. at 1501 (noting that the female emplo)ees' "recollection of specific incidents was
h ampered by the commonplace, daily nature of the comments").
'. See supra notes 27-35, 47-54 and accompanying text.
1 Pittsburgh Press, 413, U.S. at 390; Aguilar, 121 Cal. 4th at 140.
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dant employees that the trial court found to be hostile work envi-
ronment sexual harassment.' Finally, the order is based on a "con-
tinuing course of repetitive conduct."
Critics have long argued that government intervention "is power-
less to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish distinctions based upon
physical differences, and the attempt to do so can only result in ac-
centuating the difficulties of the present situation.' 3' Under this line
of reasoning, critics argue that an injunction will not really end the
use of sexually or racially discriminatory speech in the workplace,
2
because co-workers will simply use other words, or continue to harass
the plaintiff without mentioning race or sex.'33 While a single injunc-
tion or statute will not end all discrimination, and may not instantly
transform a hostile work environment into a harmonious one, injunc-
tions will help end the "most serious" types of discrimination, and
play a crucial role in preventing the creation of hostile work envi-
ronments. 134 Courts should use injunctions in cases where continuing
patterns of speech clearly indicate a hostile work environment to
show that the court is serious about ending employment discrimina-
tion. The real issue is not the limitation of employee speech, but the
increased effectiveness of Tite VII and the greater incentive for em-
ployers to institute and enforce policies preventing employment dis-
crimination,'3 5 including a hostile work environment.3 "
1 Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1502.
1s0 Pittsburgh Press Co., 413 U.S. at 390; Aguilar, 21 Cal. 4th at 140.
131 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1895).
1 See Alexander, supra note 6, at 72 (noting that blatantly racist statements may be replaced
by statements that do not specifically mention race, but carry racist implications) (citing Henry
Louis Gates,Jr., Let Them Talk, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 20 and 27, 1993 at 45).
13s General harassment alone does not violate Title VII. See Bolden v. PRC, Inc., 43 F.3d 5415,
551 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that "general taunting and torment, if not racially discriminatory,
are not actionable"); Gillum v. Federal Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 970 F. Supp. 843, 848 (D.
Kan. 1997) (holding that criticism must contain a gender-specific reference in order to consti-
tute sexual harassment in violation of Title VII).
1 H.R. REP. No. 88-914 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.CA.N. 2391, 2393 ("No bill can or
should lay claim to eliminating all the causes and consequences of racial and other types of dis-
crimination against minorities .... It is, however, possible for the Congress to enact legislation
which prohibits and provides and necessary the means of terminating the most serious types of
discrimination.").
1s, Both private and public employers have the fight to impose their own anti-discrimination
policies on employees. See Pierce, supra note 6, at 131 n.21, 132 n.24 (noting that, "[a]lthough
constrained by the First Amendment, government may restrict speech that impairs efficiency
and productivity in the workplace") (citing Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987)
(holding that workplace speech in government employment is protected under the First
Amendment)); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976) (holding that freedom of speech is
not limited by private constraints on speech).
136 SeeJudy Greenwald, Employer Must Enforce Gag Order On Worker: Court, Bus. INS., Aug. 9,
1999, at 2 (quoting Gerald Maatam, a partner in the Chicago firm Baker & McKenzie, who
notes that, "if I'm a risk manager and I want to create the best workplace possible, [Aguilar] is a
favorable decision because it says I have leeway (as an employer) to institute disciplinary proce-
dures against employees" who use racial epithets and try to defend their conduct on First
Amendment grounds).
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CONCLUSION
While Near established a general presumption against prior re-
straints, 37 injunctions against speech are not per se unlawful prior re-
straints. As the California Supreme Court held in Aguilar, an injunc-
tion against speech found to violate an anti-discrimination statute is
not a prior restraint if. (1) the order is based on a continuing course
of repetitive conduct; (2) the order is clear and sweeps no more
broadly than necessary; and (3) the order is issued after a jury finds
that the defendants engaged in unlawful employment discrimina-
tion.' When combined with the precautions already used by courts
issuing Title VII injunctions, the Aguilar three-factor test minimizes
the harms that the doctrine of prior restraint %as developed to ad-
dress, while permitting the courts to offer a more complete and effec-
tive remedy to victims of hostile-environment employment discrimi-
nation.
i- Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
133 Aguilar v. Ais Rent a Car, 21 Cal. 4th 121 (Cal. 1999).
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